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Abstract If deficits, nor defaults, don’t really matter any-
more, what sign of our times is it? What has changed from
the days that Franklin Delano Roosevelt risked the fragile
economic recovery from the great depression by returning,
in 1937, to the standard of his economic orthodoxy, a belief
in fiscal rectitude and anaversion to debts and deficits? If that
was a sign of a certain American character, what has happened
to it? A massive shift in public culture must have occurred,
affecting people’s views on public probity and political recti-
tude. The following is an attempt to trace some of the main
shifts on the way to our present quandary.
Keywords U.S. economic policy . American character . U.S.
culture . Cultural critique . Neo-liberalism
In a conversation between vice-president Dick Cheney and
Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill Cheney is quoted as
saying: BReagan proved deficits don’t matter.^ It is one telling
quotation among many that show the prevailing hubris in
government circles at the time, a belief of having cast off the
shackles of economic reality. The hubris is still there, unabat-
ed. In a review of two books tracing back the lines of devel-
opment of this hubris to the days of Nixon and Reagan, Robert
G. Kaiser reminds his readers of the 2013 House of Represen-
tatives vote to raise the national debt ceiling. Failing to do so
would effectively force the United States to default on its
obligations to creditors. The ceiling was duly raised, but 144
Republican members said no. A number among them
expressed confidence that default wouldn’t really matter (my
italics). Kaiser goes on to say: B…that a 144 members of the
House were willing to cast a vote to default on the full faith
and credit of the United States is a sign of our times.^
If deficits, nor defaults, don’t really matter anymore, what
sign of our times is it? What has changed from the days that
Franklin Delano Roosevelt risked the fragile economic recov-
ery from the great depression by returning, in 1937, to the
standard of his economic orthodoxy, a belief in fiscal rectitude
and an aversion to debts and deficits? If that was a sign of a
certain American character, what has happened to it? A mas-
sive shift in public culture must have occurred, affecting peo-
ple’s views on public probity and political rectitude. The fol-
lowing is an attempt to trace some of the main shifts on the
way to our present quandary.1
Debts in Abundance
In the early days of what its guiding lights and eager followers
called the American Studies Movement, in the United States
in the 1930s and ‘40s, and spreading abroad into the early
Cold War years under U.S. cultural diplomacy auspices, the
quest was on for establishing and defining what was variously
called the American identity, the American character, the
American mind, or even the American Self. Agreement was
never reached, which only added to the appeal of the quest.
Literary studies, the study of history, and the newly reputable
social sciences were all yoked together in the hot pursuit of
this elusive, if not chimeric, target. For good measure, rival
stories of origin were thrown into the mix. Puritan origins
were a strong contender, from Perry Miller’s Errand into the
Wilderness to Sacvan Bercovitch’s The Puritan Origins of the
American Self. But so were stories of America’s given natural
resources, of America as cornucopia, as in David Potter’s
People of Plenty, or stories of America as an ideological blank
sheet, open to be inscribed with European liberalism, to the
1 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House,
and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2004) 334. Robert G. Kaiser, BOur Conservative, Criminal, Politicians,
^ The New York Review of Books, (November 6, 2014) 56.
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exclusion of its European rivals, as in Louis Hartz’s The Lib-
eral Tradition in America. Others were working parallel veins,
such as Richard Hofstadter, and Daniel Boorstin. They were
all in their own way varying on the theme of American excep-
tionalism, exploring themes of Bdivine election^ or
Bchosenness,^ or of manifest destiny and the fore-ordained
westward course of empire, or of geographical determinism,
following in the footsteps of Frederick Jackson Turner’s fron-
tier thesis. As for the historians among these 1950s’ writers,
reference is sometimes made to them as constituting a B
school,^ the school of the consensus historians. The word is
felicitous, highlighting as it does a crucial pre-condition for
the existence of something like an American Mind, or an
American Self. It takes a shared history of like-mindedness,
a national—if not notional—consensus, for there to be such a
thing as one national identity, or one national character.
Yet, given this fevered quest for one shared national char-
acter, recognizably there in each of its individual carriers, it is
nothing but utterly ironic that much of the intellectual debate
in the United States in the 1950s was set by a book that was
out to explore B the changing American character.^ I am re-
ferring of course to The Lonely Crowd, a book commonly
linked to the name of Harvard sociologist David Riesman,
but really the result of team work.2 Rather than bringing his-
torical data together to buttress the case for one national iden-
tity, Riesman a.o. suggested that historically America may
have known two or three modal characters, following each
other in time, and each with its typical modes of behavior,
cultural tastes and appetites, and individual character struc-
ture. I may remind you here of the two main character struc-
tures that Riesman recognized. Historically, he sees Binner-
directed man^ give way to Bother-directed man.^ Inner-
directed man is the self-reliant and self-sufficient character,
redolent of the Puritan individual guided by an inner sense
of righteousness and direction, an inner compass, as Riesman
metaphorically called it. Other-directed man is the successor
personality type, entering the stage in the wake of radical
social transformations.
In a new era of greater social interdependence and much
more rapid social and cultural change, parents are no longer
able to equip their children for life with their own inner com-
pass. They now need to be trained to become social animals,
taking their cues on a daily basis from their peers, adapting
their behavior and tastes accordingly, adopting the hue and
color of the settings they find themselves in. They now orient
themselves by using, not an inner compass, but what Riesman
calls their inner radar. Other classic texts from the 1950s fur-
ther fleshed out this type, such as William H. Whyte’s The
Organization Man, highlighting the structural setting in which
increasing numbers of people spent their working lives, the
bureaucratic setting of the large-scale business corporation or
government organization.
Riesman, as I shall argue, is only one among many authors
who set out to recognize tidal changes in dominant character
types in American history as they relate to underlying social
and economic changes. As people’s characteristic patterns of
dependence—financial dependence through indebtedness
critically among them—change and as they lose such mea-
sures of autonomy as they might have grown used to seeing
as rightfully theirs, character structures and larger patterns of
culture are assumed to reflect these changes and to turn into
their symbolic representations.
Of course, as the world became increasingly bureaucratic
in its patterns of organizing society and as people became
enmeshed in large-scale structures controlling their lives, they
no longer have the option, as Polonius, in Shakespeare’s
Hamlet (ACT I SCENE III) puts it to his son Laertes: BThis
above all, to thine own self be true.^ They have to play by the
ever-changing rules of social games, that Riesman, for one,
took sardonic pleasure in analyzing. But my point is, Riesman
was not the only one to do this. He stands in a long line of
social critics who read the signs of the times in the changing
behavior patterns of their contemporaries. I will take you on a
tour d’horizon of such critical writing. Can they teach us any-
thing on the ways in which patterns of dependence—financial
dependence included—have been reflected in the modes and
tones of larger cultural eras. This will then lead to my ultimate
question concerning the current state of affairs in America.
What possible cultural reflections can we see of a current
situation where all of America, at every level, internationally
as a sovereign state, nationally as a government, and down
from there to the level of individual businesses and families, is
in deficit, on a scale of indebtedness unprecedented in its
national history? Are there any clear signs of cultural charac-
ters emerging to reflect this state of affairs?
Changes in Cultural Character
It would be tempting to see Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd as a
nodal point, a conceptual hub, where several lines of intellec-
tual gestation came together before it would inspire later por-
traits of American culture in broadly the same vein. Undoubt-
edly later work, like Christopher Lasch’s 1979 study of The
Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of
Diminishing Expectations, can be seen to echo some of
Riesman’s central characters, yet between the 1950s and the
1970s dramatic shifts had occurred in America’s structural
setting. A postwar era of explosive growth and all its unset-
tling impact on the population’s rising expectations had, by
the early 1970s, turned into its opposite, of economic stagfla-
tion and diminishing expectations of individual life chances.
2 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A
Study of the Changing American Character (New haven: Yale University
Press, 1950)
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As Lasch puts it, every age develops its own peculiar
forms of pathology, which express in exaggerated form
its underlying character structure. The pathology that
Lasch chose to use as the metaphor for the prevailing
character structure of the BMe-decade^ is narcissism. It
is an age that had seen the eclipse of individual achieve-
ment and of the satisfactions of its pursuit. BToday men
seek the kind of approval that applauds not their actions
but their personal attributes. They wish to be not so much
esteemed as admired.^ (p.59)
Lasch stands in a long line of critics of mass society. He
located the pivot of modern psychic development in the rise of
mass production, with its concomitant deskilling of workers,
destruction of economic independence, change in relations of
authority from personal to abstract, and the professionalization
of education, management, mental health, social welfare, and
the like. The result of those epochal changes was a drastic
change in the socialization of children. Individuation—the
process of the formation of individual selves—largely consists
of the gradual reduction in scale of infantile fantasies of om-
nipotence and helplessness, accompanied by the child’s mod-
est but growing sense of mastery, continually measured
against its human and material surroundings. Formerly, the
presence of potent but fallible individuals, economically
self-sufficient, with final legal and moral authority over their
children’s upbringing, provided one kind of template for the
growing child’s psychic development. As fathers (and increas-
ingly mothers) become employees, with the family’s econom-
ic survival dependent on remote, abstract corporate authori-
ties, and as caretaking parents were increasingly supervised or
replaced by educational, medical, and social-welfare bureau-
cracies, the template changed. The child now has no human-
size authority figures in the immediate environment against
which to measure itself and so reduce its fantasies to human
scale. As a result, it continues to alternate between fantasies of
omnipotence and helplessness. This makes acceptance of
limits, finitude, and death more difficult, which in turn makes
commitment and perseverance of any kind—civic, artistic,
sexual, parental—more difficult.
The result is narcissism, which Lasch, in the opening pages
of Culture of Narcissism, described thus:
Having surrendered most of his technical skills to
the corporation, [the contemporary American] can
no longer provide for his material needs. As the
family loses not only its productive functions but
many of its reproductive functions as well, men
and women no longer manage even to raise their
children without the help of certified experts. The
atrophy of older traditions of self-help has eroded
everyday competence, in one area after another,
and has made the individual dependent on the state,
the corporation, and other bureaucracies.
Narcissism represents the psychological dimension of
this dependence. Notwithstanding his occasional illusions
of omnipotence, the narcissist depends on others to vali-
date his self-esteem. He cannot live without an admiring
audience. His apparent freedom from family ties and in-
stitutional constraints does not free him to stand alone or
to glory in his individuality. On the contrary, it contributes
to his insecurity, which he can overcome only by seeing
his Bgrandiose self^ reflected in the attentions of others,
or by attaching himself to those who radiate celebrity,
power, and charisma. For the narcissist, the world is a
mirror, whereas the rugged individualist saw it as an emp-
ty wilderness to be shaped to his own design. Narcissism
refers to a weak, ungrounded, defensive, insecure, manip-
ulative self—what Lasch’s next book, eponymously titled,
labeled Bthe minimal self.^
Yet readers may be forgiven if they recognize in Lasch’s
narcissistic personality the traits of Riesman’s other-directed
man. Lasch vehemently denies the similarity, the family like-
ness. As he argues, BAmericans have not really become more
sociable and cooperative, as the theorists of other-direction
and conformity would like us to believe, they have merely
become more adept at exploiting the conventions of interper-
sonal relations for their own benefit.^ (p. 66) This could only
be argued by someone totally missing out on the sardonic
pleasure Riesman takes in analyzing precisely the one-
upmanship involved in the interactions of other-directed per-
sons, with their eye on the main chance to upstage others.
Riesman’s other-directed man is more than just the incarnation
of Dale Carnegie’s smooth social operator, the central charac-
ter of his immensely successful 1936 B How to…^ book, and
held up as a model for all to follow on their way to success,
Bwinning friends and influencing people.^ Carnegie did catch
unfailingly a cultural shift underway ever since the 1920s, a
demotion of certain long-respected virtues, where character
gave way to personality, self-control to self-fulfillment, indus-
try and thrift to skill at handling people. Carnegie’s engineer-
ing of the self constructed a model of modern individualism
composed entirely of serial images, disjointed, lacking any
logic of inner cohesion, with no sturdy commitments or be-
liefs, no firm moral standards, no authentic and rooted core of
self, (words that might have been Lasch’s, but are not).3 In
Carnegie’s view, it consisted only of a pliable personality ea-
ger to please others and advance socially and economically.
All this we may recognize in Riesman’s type of the other-
directed man, or for that matter—think of Bno authentic and
rooted core of self^—in Lasch’s narcissist. But there is so
much more that feeds into Riesman’s perspective, and into
his tongue-in-cheek, picaresque pantheon of tricksters and
confidence men. After all, who can forget the unforgettable
3 The words are quoted from Steven Watts, Self-Help Messiah: Dale
Carnegie and Success in Modern America (Other Press, 2014)
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personae that Riesman conjured up, like the inside-dopester (
a word it took me years to probe in its depths of American
colloquial resonance)? There are echoes here of the Chicago
School in Sociology, and central figures like George Herbert
Mead and Herbert George Blumer and their ideas on symbolic
interactionism, echoes also of seminal insights into the social
construction of the self, as a process of ongoing social nego-
tiations and interactions like so many feedback loops
informing people’s trajectory towards self-definition. One is
also reminded of Erving Goffman, another Chicago School
name and author of the classic The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life. They are all examples of a special intellectual
sensibility and an alertness to concepts like personality and
culture seen as essentially open and in flux. Goffman in par-
ticular had an ear and an eye for the trickster element in all
this, for the histrionics and theatricality in people’s social
strategies.
Yet another resonance that we may pick up reading Ries-
man is the unmistakable voice of Thorstein Veblen, odd man
out in the history of American sociology and economics, yet a
one-man fount of insight, critique and sardonic wit. He wrote
at a time, in the late 19th, early 20th century, of rapid trans-
formation across a wide swathe of life in America. Relative
latecomer to industrialization and urbanization that America
was, much like Germany in Europe in the fevered catch-up of
its so-called BGründerjahre^—the years of industrial take-off
—students of society in both countries invented new concepts
for analytically capturing the advent of modernization. These
were the years that Alan Trachtenberg would call the age of
incorporation, the years in which a business paradigm of
large-scale rational organization began to dictate most peo-
ple’s workaday lives. Not only had the systems of production
dramatically increased in scale, so had the attending systems
of control and governance. Increasing numbers of people had
become enmeshed in a web of bureaucracy, putting them at an
ever growing remove from the actual line of production. A
parallel world arose, of staff workers alongside line workers, a
world of growing abstractness, losing point and purpose for
those involved. This new world was explored and analysed in
Germany by leading early sociologists like Max Weber or
Alfred Tönnies. Weber came up with the metaphor of the
Biron cage^ to capture the social experience of life in a bu-
reaucratic setting. Tönnies introduced the pair of opposed con-
cepts of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft, words that in their
English translation lose the evocative force they have in Ger-
man. Early American sociology came up with a felicitous
parallel, though, opposing primary to secondary social
relations.
In this view the rich affective resonance of primary groups,
like the family, neighborhood and local community, stood
opposed to the cold and formal qualities of secondary rela-
tions, connecting people merely through formalized social
roles. The latter evoke the world of the office window, bank
tellers, secretaries and desk workers, a world that was increas-
ingly liquid, losing form and meaning for the self-definition of
all those involved, eating away at the many-stranded bonds of
civil society, eroding its social capital. In this BGreat Transfor-
mation,^ as Karl Polanyi memorably called it, a self-
regulating market was to emerge, turning human beings and
the natural environment into commodities.4
Yet, as many observers at the time noted, human beings did
not take this lying down. New social stages for public self-
definition evolved which allowed people to explore early
forms of a consumption culture with a view to setting them-
selves apart from others and distinguish themselves in the
public eye. This is the stage that Veblen exposed in his first
published book, The Theory of the Leisure Class. In it he lets
his eyes roam across the wide array of strategies of social
distinction through the ostentation of spending behavior. His
sardonic wit coined phrases for the description of this behav-
ior that survive until the present day, words such as
Bconspicuous consumption,^ Binvidious distinction,^ or
Bmarginal differentiation.^ 5 The latter term in particular sur-
vived through Freud’s reflections on the narcissism of minor
differences for the exalted display of individuality. In current
post-modern analyses, the strategic point in using this form of
narcissism is to achieve a superficial sense of one’s own
uniqueness, an ersatz sense of individual distinctness which
is only a mask for an underlying uniformity and sameness. If
Veblen is to rank as a social and cultural critic here is the
reason why: he exposed the underlying vacuity of an era
whose cultural parameters were set by the robber baron and
the alienated office worker. If there is a dialectic at work here,
it is that between the alienated many and the extortionist few
whomanage to get something for nothing. It is the group who,
not unlike Karl Marx’s expropriating capitalists, have kept
their eyes on the main chance and the main prize. With char-
acteristic sarcasm Veblen calls them the impropriators, reviv-
ing an old word from the world of canonic law to highlight the
impropriety of expropriation. BSo there has been incorporated
in American commonsense and has grown into American
practice the presumption that all the natural resources of the
country must of right be held in private ownership , by those
persons who have been lucky enough or shrewd enough to
take them over according to the rules in such cases made and
provided, or by those who have acquired title from these orig-
inal impropriators.^6
As one further interpretative revisit of the era reminds us,
the telling metaphor for the period may be its fashionable
middle-class affliction which went by the name of
4 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation [Foreword by Robert M.
MacIver] ( New York: Farrar & Rinehart., 1944)
5 S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc. , 1961)
6 Wesley C. Mitchell, ed.,What Veblen Taught: Selections from the Writ-
ings of Thorstein Veblen (New York: The Viking Press, 1945) 372
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neurasthenia, best described as the physical symptoms of
French poet Paul Verlaine’s Blangueur monotone.^Neurasthe-
nia, as author T.J. Jackson Lears suggests in his No Place of
Grace,7 was the medicalized expression, if not representation,
of a more general feeling that in view of modern life having
grown dry and passionless, one must somehow try to regen-
erate a lost intensity of feeling. But not only that. As Jackson
Lears points out: BLate Victorians felt hemmed in by busy-
ness, clutter, propriety; they were beset by religious anxieties,
and by debilitating worries about financial insecurity.^ There
was a financial dimension to the way Americans responded to
the transformation of their collective life in the late 19th cen-
tury. It is what drove the new games played with the commod-
ities produced by America’s industrial machine, transforming
them into signs and symbols of material success in a social
arena shot through with status anxieties and feelings of eco-
nomic insecurity. Whether or not individual Americans came
out on top, they were all equally drawn into a new social game
that before long would form an integral part of America’s
nascent culture of consumption.
That cultural transformation came with its own key word,
abundance. At long last the American Dream could appear to
have come into its own, unlocking a veritable cornucopia,
fulfilling what had in fact been age-old European fairytale
dreams of a land of plenty, Bun pays de Cocaigne^ (which
today does not sound right if translated back as a land of
cocaine) or for that matter a Marxian dream of a realm of
scarcity being replaced by a realm of affluence. Entering the
1920s America seemed to have led the way into this realm,
even in the eyes of assorted European socialists, syndicalists
and even communists.
Jackson Lears made abundance the topic of a separate
study, published as Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History
of Advertising in America.8 Similarly, one of the seminal au-
thors in this field, father of contemporary cultural history and
cultural studies as we know them today, Warren Susman, sug-
gested as the backdrop for his explorations of 20th-century
cultural trends in America the single word abundance.9 B…
struggling to articulate for myself and my students some def-
inition of what our culture is like and how it got this way, I find
that I was developing almost unconsciously a way of under-
standing American culture: I was coming to see America
through the notion of ‘the culture of abundance.’^ (p. xx) As
he came to see it, one of the fundamental conflicts of
twentieth-century America is between two cultures—an older
culture, often loosely labeled Puritan-republican, producer-
capitalist culture, and a newly emerging culture of abundance.
As those familiar with his work will remember, Susman really
made his mark developing approaches to the problem of cap-
turing signs of this cultural transformation taking place.Work-
ing in a pre-digital age, he truly morphed into a one-man
logarithm, pioneering work that would later be known as da-
ta-mining, producing word clouds as if he were a cutting-edge
digital historian. Word clouds? Yes, world clouds. With char-
acteristic inquisitiveness and sensitivity to the uses of lan-
guage he struck upon submerged shifts in the frequency with
which words were used, unearthingwords that were becoming
the shibboleths of their age. Words came in packages, coher-
ing through their contextual uses; some were on the way out,
falling into disuse, others pushed forward. And Susman pre-
sented them as word clouds. Here is Susman at work: BInitial
investigations to answer such questions yielded suggestions of
significant transformation. Key words began to show them-
selves: plenty, play, leisure, recreation, self-fulfillment,
dreams, pleasure, immediate gratification, personality, public
relations, publicity, celebrity. Everywhere there was a new
emphasis on buying, spending, and consuming.^ (p. xxiv) In
a brilliant chapter he shows how the older culture, Puritan-
republican, producer-capitalist demanded something it called
Bcharacter,^ which stressed moral qualities, deeply ingrained,
whereas the newer culture insisted on Bpersonality,^ which
emphasized being liked and admired. It is not hard to see these
two key words as foreshadowing Riesman’s later social types
of the inner-directed man and the other-directed man, only
taken forward in time to the turn of the 19th century.
Susman and Jackson Lears both mention advertising as a
critical new use of new technologies of mass communication
for the new world of abundance and mass consumption to
function smoothly. Susman even mentions one of advertis-
ing’s central functions lying in its actively creating wants,
inducing consumer demand for novel products entering the
market. Advertising in that sense plays a critical role in
balancing supply and demand, in channeling production to
meet consumption. And in fact, one of the standard accounts
of the causes of the Great Depression is precisely in terms of
over-production, of a failure of market mechanisms. But there
is such a thing as under-consumption, of lagging demand due
to stagnant purchasing power among the mass of consumers.
And the remarkable thing, going over Susman’s word clouds
as they hang about the capitalized word ABUNDANCE, is the
total absence of words connected to debt, insolvency and
poverty.
There is one student of the American Dream of Abundance
who has his eye out for this different set of words, which, if
they form a cloud, it is surely a storm cloud. Roland
Marchand, in his Advertising the American Dream: Making
Way For Modernity, 1920–1940, in fact makes this central
point that the advent of consumer culture brought with it a
radical break with older virtues such as frugality, financial
7 T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Anti-Modernism and the Trans-
formation of American Culture, 1880–1920 (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1981)
8 T.J. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Adver-
tising in America (New York: Basic books, 1994)
9 Warren I. Susman,Culture AsHistory: The Transformation of American
Society in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973)
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prudence and a general aversion to debt. All this went over-
board in the 1920s. A general buy-now, pay-later attitude was
advertised in its own right as the thoroughly modern way to
go. As Lizabeth Cohen reminds us, all expenditure for private
consumption came to be seen in the later 1930s and ‘40s as
good citizenship, keeping the national economy going and
growing.10 But much of the spending critically hinged on
financing mechanisms, through installment plans, charge
cards, and other forms of deficit financing, and let individual
consumers blithely run up private debts. Yet never did the
debts collectively amassed in this 1920s’ trial run of consum-
erism reach the heights theywould a half century later. Nor did
they set a tone of cultural life or produce a new social type as
they may have much later. Christopher Lasch may have been
on to something when he set out to explore a novel social
character structure in his Age of Narcissism, or for that matter
in his Haven in a Heartless World, against the background of
what he termed an Bage of diminishing expectations.^
America’s Cultural Character at the End of Empire
Given the immense debt overhang at every aggregate level of
American society, how does this situation reflect in the writing
of social commentators, historians and cultural critics? What
forms of representation, what symbolic reflections, can we
recognize? What sort of Colossus is America today, sole re-
maining superpower, a hegemon by any measure, yet deeply
indebted to the main rival to its power, China? Are what we
are witnessing the signs of the end of empire, of its unstoppa-
ble decline?
In one analysis of America’s status as an empire, Charles
Maier makes the following interesting distinction. Asking
himself the question whether America can rank as an empire
among empires, and if so on what grounds compared to earlier
historical cases, he distinguishes two historical stages in the
American case: America as an empire of production followed
by America as an empire of consumption. By the latter term
Maier does not, as one may briefly expect, refer to America’s
era of consumerism and the cultural forms attending it. What
he evokes is not America as an empire with the full panoply of
the soft power of its culture of consumerism. No, he wishes to
bring out the stark contrast between America as the marvel of
productive prowess that it was in the mid-20th century and the
America that can no longer produce all it wishes to consume.
So from being an net exporter of goods it produced, it turned
into a net importer, with its trade balance duly reflecting this
shift. From being a creditor nation it had turned into a debtor
nation, losing independence and freedom of action in the pro-
cess. Now if there are signs of empire declining to be read in
these secular trends, of an empire depending not only on
borrowed money, but on borrowed time, are they beginning
to dawn on the broader American population? And if so, what
effect do they have on America’s over-all state of mind?
It doesn’t take the documentary eye of a Michael Moore to
conjure up a visual America replete with the signs of decay,
decadence and defeat. Forgotten veterans of America’s far-
away wars—far-away geographically, but more dramatically
far-away from the public consciousness, repressed and pushed
out of the public sphere—bring to mind Georg Gross’ depic-
tions of World War I veterans limping through Berlin streets.
There is a seething anger among Americans, aimed at the
impotence of presidents, of politics, aimed at the one-percent
of the obscenely rich, an anger thrashing about wildly, yet
unable to find meaningful expression, other than in a politics
of resentment, Tea party politics, gun-toting and empty patri-
otic gestures. It is the anger of the self-styled militia, vindictive
and utterly nihilistic. If there is a changing American character
to be recognized here, we need a Richard Hofstadter to do it
for us. After all, he has done it before, magisterially describing
for us the paranoid style in American politics.11
And yet, paranoia as a metaphor seems to cover only part of
what I wish to capture. Paranoia does not stretch any farther
than the lunatic fringe whose conspiratorial fantasies see the
federal government in Washington, DC. as one big plot
against the freedoms of individual Americans. As a metaphor
it does not begin to account for statistics that show the pro-
portion of Americans who still trust a government institution
like Congress to be a meager 7 % or the proportion of Amer-
icans who expect their children to be worse off than they are to
be a staggering two thirds. These are signs of collective disaf-
fection in the face of a dysfunctional political system and of a
collective sense of loss of control and direction. Nor is it only a
matter of politics and a lack of citizen empowerment. It
doesn’t take the conspiratorial view of Hofstadter’s paranoid
style to see the economic system as producing ever growing
income and property gaps. You don’t have to be a Riesman-
like inside-dopester to take seriously a view of the world of
finance as driven by self-interest, geared against standards of
decency and public service, a view presented in an award-
winning, muck-raking documentary film like Inside Job.12 It
is a world of sharks, sharpers, and conmen, where banks are
betting against their own customers, and where suckers are
born every minute. If all this has led to a massive breakdown
of social trust, it is not so much a sign of paranoia as it is of
rational people who duly feel duped.
There is a number of best-selling books that have all tried to
diagnose this mounting distrust, this erosion of America’s social
capital or of its habits of the heart, all noticing secular trends
10 L. Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption
in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003) Ch. 3.
11 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and other
essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952)
12 Charles Ferguson, Inside Job (Sony Pictures, 2010)
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away from golden ages of civic enthusiasm and levels of en-
gaged public debate and of trust worthy of a republic.13 They all
notice a secular slippage away from Tocquevillean standards of
a multi-stranded associative life, of an erosion of civil religion
and civic participation, of a loss of social capital. They all see
the downward slope of democratic vigor, yet tend to miss the
aspect of a rational assessment of reality behind it. Rather than
people bowling alone because they no longer join social clubs,
people have chosen to withdraw from politics, have withdrawn
their trust from economic institutions, and no longer believe
what they are told by talking heads on their TV’s. They have
done this because they have knowledge of Wall Street inside
jobs and related fraud, not because they have let themselves be
passively Bframed^ by the relentless distortion of public debate
that now passes for TV journalism. Outside the dysfunctional
media landscape, where enlightened public debate has been
bought out by private capital and the nihilistic ideology of cor-
porate interests, many are now exploring ways to restore Bsocial
capital,^ finding ways of discussing a political agenda that no
longer will get a fair hearing in the traditional halls of the re-
public. If the American character is morphing once again, it is
not in the direction of people bowling alone, but toward the B
agora,^ the onlinemarketplace of ideas and organized action, of
life in cyberspace. It may not be the only crowd roaming
America’s public space, a lonely crowd it certainly isn’t.
This ironically takes us back to the theme of Bprimary
groups^ as the mainstay of Tocqueville’s civil society. Ever
since Polanyi’s BGreat Transformation,^ or Trachtenberg’s
Bincorporation^ of America, there has been an ongoing quest
for signs of primary groups surviving and kicking. If the ad-
vent of modernity meant the demise of communitarian set-
tings and primary relationships, students of society kept spot-
ting primary groups in the most unlikely settings. In urban life,
where the early Chicago School had explored Burbanism as a
way of life,^ and celebrated its modernity, individualism, and
cosmopolitanism, integrated community structures were
found to have survived, even thrived, as Herbert Gans showed
in his Urban Villagers. If the advent of new media, such as
radio, spawned big national broadcasting corporations, this
need not have been the only, pre-ordained outcome. As
Lizabeth Cohen showed in her Making a New Deal,
working-class communities in a metropolis like Chicago for
a brief period managed to harness the medium to give voice to
the local community rather than the impersonal corporatism
that characterizes the current media landscape. If, in the world
of industrial work, Taylorism and the rationalization of pro-
duction meant the reduction of individual workers to mere
cogs in a machine, early industrial relations research in, e.g.,
Elton Mayo’s classic Hawthorne studies pointed up the power
of informal groups on the work floor to bend the rigidity of
imposed production norms. If in politics the individual voter
was seen as increasingly alienated and atomized, studies at the
local level once again showed the role played by informal
groups, inspiring an interpretive paradigm, popular in the
1950s, known as pluralist elitism. Robert Dahl’sWhoGoverns
is the classic reference here, althoughDavid Riesman’s Lonely
Crowd memorably contributed to the new paradigm with its
view of what he called Bveto groups,^ informal groups strong
enough to block political decisions they do not like, yet insuf-
ficiently strong to have things their own way. It is basically a
return to classic Tocquevillean intimations about American
politics as the interplay of a multiplicity of groups.14
Yet, undeniably, all these examples can be seen as so many
exercises in nostalgia, as studies of lost causes. If processes of
incorporation, under auspices of an impersonal neo-liberal-
ism, have now gone global, can we possibly conceive of a
response along Bprimary group^ lines to get us out of the Biron
cage^ of globalization? For an answer we might look at the
ways in which an international commonwealth, literally a re-
public, a res publica, organizes itself around issues of human
rights, the environment, and economic inequality, through the
network possibilities of the World Wide Web. In areas like
these, on a global scale, the social capital is being formed of
a civil society that is truly trans-national.
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